A PARALELL OF GOVERNMENTS:

OR,

A Politicall Diſcourſe upon ſeven Poſitions, tending to the Peace of *England*, and preſervation of the Citie of *London*.

Sapiens Dominabitur Aſtris.

ECCLES. 9. 14, 15, 16, &c.

There was a little Citie, and few men within it, and there came a great King againſt it, and beſieged it, and built great bulwarkes againſt it.

Now there was found in it a poore wiſe man, and he by his wiſdome delivered the Citie, yet no man remembred that ſame poore wiſe man.

Then ſaid I, Wiſdome is better then ſtrength, nevertheleſſe the poore mans wiſdome is deſpiſed, and his words are not heard.

Wiſdome is better then weapons of Warre, but one ſinner deſtroyeth much good.

Printed in the yeare 1647.

TO ALL

TRULY PIOUS, SOBER AND WELL-Affected-Engliſhmen to the good of their Countrey.

THeſe troubleſome times doe fully manifeſt the truth of that Aſſertion which *Philo* makes in his Booke of the Life of *Abraham*, That *Mans life is a mixture of good with evill, an oppoſition of falſehood to truth*; yet ſuch is evermore the finall victory of Truth, *That they which have not the hearts to love her, acknowledge, that to hate her they have no cauſe.* Our lives in this world are partly guided by Rules, partly by Examples; God hath created nothing to bee idle, or ill employed; the contemplation of theſe premiſes, have incited mee in this preſent Age, (wherein zeale hath drowned charity, and skill meekneſſe) to recommend the following Diſcourſe unto you, *The chiefeſt inſtrument of our humane communion* (as

Ariſtotle ſtiles it) *whereby wee impart mutually one to another the conceits of our reaſonable underſtanding*; heartily wiſhing, that hereby you may reape the profit of my ſtudies; for *Philip de Comines* ſaith, *Reading profiteth two manner of wayes, the one by acquainting us with the Ages paſt, the other by teaching us more in a Book in three months, then twenty men living ſucceſſively by experience can learne.* Enjoy my Labours freely, and I pray God (that giveth underſtanding) to proſper them in your hands, and to teach you to *know wiſdome, and inſtruction, to perceive the words of underſtanding, to receive the inſtruction of wiſdome, juſtice, judgement and equity, to give ſubtilty to the ſimple, and to the young men knowledge and diſcretion.* And ſo I bid you farewell.

Prov. 1. 2, 3, 4.

A Paralell of Governments, with Corollaries or Concluſions concerning the Kingdome of *England*.

THough to the common ſort of people ſuch deliberations as carry the faireſt ſhewes, are wont to be more pleaſing, then thoſe which are mature and well digeſted; and though *the nature of the Common People is alwayes inclined to hope more then they ought, and to endure leſſe then is neceſſary, alwayes thirſting after innovations, and never contented with the time preſent, taking counſell neither of diſcretion nor reaſon, but of their will and arrogancie*; yet when I conſider that mens judgements are, or ought to be cleared by the due obſervations of theſe late times, (if they be not wholly given up to the miſ-leading obſtinacie of ſelf-deceiving opinion) & that there are many both Honorable, wiſe, wealthy and honeſt perſons in this Kingdome of *England*, eſpecially reſiding in and about this City of *London*, who are perfect well-wiſhers to the peace and welfare of their native Countrey, and on whom the irreſiſtible perſvaſion of convincing truth enforced, and confirmed to them by reaſon, experience, and Authority may faſten, (though peradventure ſome of them have bin heretofore carried away with the violent tide of the errours of theſe preſent times) I ſhall out of an aſſured hope of their candid acceptance, adventure this ſhort Diſcourſe to their publike view, being confident, *That thoſe new and unuſuall councels, (which were taken in the raiſing and proſecuting of this late Warre) though happily at the firſt ſight they might ſeeme juſt and glorious, yet without doubt they are already, or ſoon will be found by them to be more dangerous and doubtfull, then ſuch as at all times have beene approved by all men, by reaſon and experience.* The conſideration of theſe poſitions in this turbulent age wherein we live, being improved unto us by the Authority and remembrance of by-paſt times, will ſerve as a Directory to the weakeſt

weakeſt judgments to draw forth infallible concluſions of theſe undenyable verities.

1. Firſt, that Monarchicall Government is of more eaſe and benefit to the Subjects that live under it, then the Government or Domination of a popular Republike, or Free State, be it either a Common-wealth inlarged over many Provinces, or a State confined to the Walls, or Precincts of a City.

2. Secondly, that it is much better, and more profitable to the Subjects, to beare the irregularities of their Prince with patience, then to ſeek to redreſſe the injury by Armes, or to make an innovation in the Government.

3. Thirdly, that by attempting an innovation in Government, the Prince always gains, but the Subject is a loſer by the action.

4. Fourthly, that thoſe that ſeek to make themſelves Lords over their fellow Subjects by force of Armes, under a pretence of Reformation of their Princes defects in Government, are alwayes, if they have ſucceſſe, much more cruell and tyrannous to the Subjects, then thoſe they impute thoſe crimes unto, or againſt whoſe Government they fancied exceptions.

5. Fifthly, that by a long continued war of the people againſt their naturall King, the Kingdome will be ſo weakned, that in the end it wil becom a prey to ſome neighbor Prince or Nation.

6. Sixtly, that no peace can be ſafe, nor conditions ſurely kept, where either the Princes Rights are wreſted from him by force of Armes, or extorted from him by feare or reſtraint.

7. Seventhly and laſtly, that the City of *London* can never be ſo happy or flouriſhing under the ſtrained Government of the two Houſes of this preſent Parliament, as under the protection of their naturall King.

1. As to the firſt of theſe concluſions, or rather convincing truths; *Reaſon hath alwayes taught, & experience doth wel confirm it, that things which depend upon the counſell of many, doe never ſucceed well*; for alwayes in popular Governments, where the people beare ſway, *Wiſdome is ſurmounted with raſhneſſe, the authority of the better ſort giving place to the will of the greater part*: And it is uſually found in the Councels of Free States, that the buſie and obſtinate heads of a few do carry all the reſt. Therefore *Machiavell* in his Diſcourſe upon *Livy*, hath delivered it for a generall Rule, *That never, or ſeldome it chances, that any Repub-*

Republique, or Commonwealth, or Kingdom, is from the beginning well ordained, or throughly well reformed, or can be well governed, unlesse the disposing of it depend upon the wisdome and discretion of one only person. Nay, saith he, rather there is a necessity of it, that one be absolute, that appoints the manner how, & by whose understanding all such ordination is regulated. This great Polititian brings two pertinent instances; *one from the State of Rome in Italy, which was originally founded in Monarchy; another from that of Sparta in Lacedemonia:* which being founded in sole & soveraign Authoritie by *Lycurgus* that excellent Law-giver, was after, by corruption of time, brought into the Condition of an *Aristocracie* by the *Ephori*; wherewith the people being sore oppress, assisted *Cleomenes* their King to suppresse the *Ephori, whereby that Province recovered their ancient liberty, to the great ease and benefit of the people.* *Guicciardine* discoursing of the Civill Wars of *Italy* (that Country being Cantonized into many petty Principalities, free States, and popular Governments, *which evermore inflames War amongst them*) sets down this for an infallible rule, *That it is better for the weale of every Countrey to serve one only and mighty Lord or King, then to have in every Towne Lords particular, or free States, who neither for their weaknesse can defend them, nor for their povertie are able to doe them good*; but rather finding their Revenues insufficient to entertaine them, are constrained to oppresse them: This was the case of *Pisa*, when it fought against the State of *Florence*; and the case of *Florence*, whilst it was a free State under the Government of their *Pregati*, or Senate; and the case of *Genoa* under her popular Governours, against the King of *France*; and is now the case of the subjects of the State of *Venice*, under the domination of the *Venetian* Senate. *Cleon* in *Thucidides* very truly tells the *Athenians, That their dominion over their subjects was none other then a meere Tyrannie*, though it were so that themselves were a great Citie and a popular State. The state of this Question is exceedingly well disputed by that famous & learned Historian Sir *Walter Raleigh*, whom the world will witnesse for, *that he was no flatterer to Kings or Monarchs*, much lesse to Tyrants of any kind or condition whatsoever; who handling this position, (*That the Tyrannie of a free State or Citie over her subjects is worse then the Tyrannie of one man*) useth these words: I say therefore, as I have said elsewhere, *That it were better to live*

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under one onely pernitious Tyrant, then under many thousands: The reasons proving this, are too many to set downe, but few may suffice; the desires of one man, how inordinate soever, if they cannot be satisfied, yet they may be wearied: he is not able to search all corners, his humour may be found, and soothed; age, or good advice, yea, or some unexpected accident may reforme him; all which fayling, yet is there hope that his successor may prove better. Many a Tyrant hath been changed into a worthy King, and many have ill used their ill-gotten Dominion, which becomming hereditarie to their posteritie, hath growne into the most excellent form of Government, even a lawfull Monarchy: But they that live under a Tyrannicall Citie, have no such hope; their Mistris is immortall, and will not slacken the reines, untill they be pulled out of her hands, and her owne Mouth receive the Bridle of a more mightier Charioteer; *This is wofull:* yet their present sufferings make them lesse mindfull of the future; new Flyes, and hungry ones, fall upon the same Soare, out of which others had alreadie sucked their fill; a new Governour comes yearely among them, attended by all his poore kindred and friends, who meane not to returne home emptie to their Hives, without a good lading of Wax and Honey: these flye into all quarters, and are quickly acquainted with every mans wealth, or whatsoever else in all the Province is worthy to be desired; they know all a mans enemies, and all his feares, becomming themselves within a little space the enemies that he feareth most. To grow into acquaintance with these Masterfull Guests, in hope to win their friendship, were an endlesse labour (yet it must be under-gone) and such as every one hath not meanes to goe about: but were this effected, what availeth it? The love of one Governour is purchased with Gifts, the successor of this man he is more loving then could be wished, in respect of a faire Wife, or Daughter: then comes the third, perhaps of the contrary faction, at home a bitter enemy to both his fore-goers, who seeks the ruine of all that have bin inward with them; so the miseries of this Tyrannie are not simple, but interlaced (as it were) with the calamities of Civill Warre. The *Romans* had a Law *de Repetundis*, or of recoverie against extorting Magistrates: yet wee finde, that it served not wholly to restraine their Provinciall Governours, who presuming on the favour of their owne Citizens,

Citizens, and of their kindred, and friends at home, were bold in their Provinces to work all these enormities rehearsed, though somewhat the more sparingly, for feare of judgement. If the subjects of *Rome* groaned under such oppressions, what must we thinke of those that were Vassalls unto *Carthage*? The *Romans* imposed no burthensome Tributes, they loved not to heare, that their Empire was grievous, they condemned many able Citizens for having been ill Governours; At *Carthage* all went quite contrary; the Rapines newly devised by one Magistrate served as presidents to instruct another, every man resolved to do the like, when it should fall to his turne, & he was held a notable Statesman, whose Robberies had been such, as might afford a good share to the common Treasure; Particular examples of this *Carthaginian* Practise are not extant. The Government of *Verres* the *Roman* in *Sicily* that is lively set out by *Tully* may serve to informe us, what was the demeanor of those Punick Rulers, who stood in feare of no such condemnation as *Verres* underwent: by prosecuting this discourse I might inferre a more generall Proposition, That a City cannot governe her subject Provinces so mildly as a King; but it is enough to have shewed that the Tyranny of a City or free State, is farre more intollerable then that of any one most wicked man: Thus far Sir *Walter Raleigh*.

And we see by late experience that the state of *Venice* hath so oppressed the subjects of the severall Provinces under her obedience, that she dares not trust them with Arms for her defence, for feare of Revolt, but shee is constrained to her Mercenaries, and to make use of the Armes of strangers, for the resistance of her invading Enemies; nay we see that within the effluxion of these three last yeares past, wherein she hath been urged with a war in a great part of her Territories by the Turke; that many of her Subjects both in the Isle of *Candia*, and in the Provinces of *Dalmatia* and *Morlachia*, by reason of her extraordinary taxations & impositions under which she groaned, have diserted her obedience, and cast themselves upon the mercy and protection of the Turke, from whom they can expect nothing, but irkesome servitude; chusing rather to run the hazard of a rigid slavery, then to labour under the burthen of an assured, and continuall oppression: It being an undenyable Maxime, that the Tyranny

of an enemy is more easie to be endured, as being more just, then the unjust cruelty of a friend. To *conclude this first point, the two Houses of Parliament have of late called themselves States, and Christned this Kingdome a State, both in vulgar appellation, and in their publike transactions with forraigne Nations, which names they having assumed, it is all the reason that can bee, that I should allow them the properties of a State, or Common-wealth, which besides the properties afore-mentioned belonging to free States, there is one more essentiall quality incident unto them* as a free State, or Common-wealth, which is, *To maintaine the Publique wealthy, and the particulars poore, and alwaies in Commotion*, as the practice of all free States now is, and ever hath been since there was any knowledge of them in History, as I could instance, if desire to avoid prolixity did not prevent me on so copious a Subject: and on the contrary, it is the maxime of Kings to maintaine their Subjects in wealth, and peace, because the riches of the people, and the peace of their Kingdomes, are the strength and glory of their Soveraignes.

3. In the truth of the second Position, I need not labour overmuch; since that in all humane affaires which have relation to Government, it is plaine and evident, that upon the cutting off of one inconvenient, another will straight arise that is far more pernicious: *That both the word of God, and the practice of our blessed Saviour, his holy Apostles, and the Primitive Christians, informe us, that in things lawfull an active obedience is due from us to our King, and in things unlawfull (to say no more) a passive:* And that rules of true policy assure us, that in errors of Government, inferiours ought to use moderation towards their superiours, having more regard to necessity, then a just discontentment; for in State-affaires, it is dangerous to use a medicine stronger then the nature of the disease, or complexion of the Patient will suffer, and to enter into greater perils, can be no remedy for dangers present. If a King shall play the Tyrant, or oppresse his people with illegall, and immoderate impositions, or breake his Lawes, (which I am confident no man can truly object or lay to our most gracious Kings charge, and wherein before any warre leavyed against him in this Kingdome he had not given ample reparation, and satisfaction to his people, by whole Acts of grace he passed at the desires of his people in

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this preſent Parliament) it is no prudent ground, nor beneficiall to the Subject, (for I will lay aside for the preſent the warrantableneſſe of it) to ſeek to redreſſe theſe injuries by raiſing Armes againſt him; for as Sir *Walter Raleigh* well obſerves, *It is better for Subjects to endure the ſucceſſive Tyrannies of ten ſeverall oppreſſing Tyrants then three yeares Civill Warre in a Kingdome.* To conclude this Poſition, of all the imperfections, and evill conditions of a people, this is placed amongſt the moſt principall, to be inſatiable, and never content with their degree: Reſpect of hatred, and deſire to beare rule are things which eaſily draw men to dangerous conſequences. In all changes of eſtates the preſervation ought to anſwer the charge of the acquiſition: The charge expended in this late warre for the purchaſe of a new Reformation in Government, and reſtitution of infringed Liberties, hath already coſt more, then the benefit the Subject can receive by it, will amount unto in theſe ten ages to come, (if there were no more trouble to enſue,) therefore if I ſhould admit this kinde of medicine to be wholſome, for the purging of a Government from inconveniences, yet it being not Miniſtred in due proportion, nor in a time convenient, (becauſe of the vertues, and juſt Government of our Royall Soveraigne) I may without bluſhing affirme, That it is rather a poyſon, then a medicine, to cure the miſeries of this diſtreſſed Kingdome: *Kingdomes never change them without great combuſtions, and ſubjects ſuffer worſe miſchiefes by them then by not enduring inſolent Princes. Wiſe men of two evills alwayes chooſe the leſſe.*

The third Poſition will bee proved unto us by infallible reaſon, and manifold examples, that in all Civill warres of Subjects againſt their Prince, the people and not the Prince will be loſers by the hand. *In matters of State it is no ſmall ſlander when unadviſedneſſe is accompanyed with detriment. Reſpect of hatred, and deſire to beare rule,* (as before is ſaid) *are things which lead men eaſily to dangerous deliberations.* But to be carryed with paſſion againſt our proper profit, is nothing elſe but lightneſſe, and to eſteeme more dangers that be little then ſuch as be great, cannot but hold of folly, and indiſcretion; when Subjects riſe up in Armes againſt their Soveraigne, it is not ſo

much out of an opinion in their owne judgements, that their undertakings are just, as that they hope their enterprzes may prove successefull; *for the desires of Subjects are many times violent to embrace Colours, whereby they may with any shew of honesty under pretence of liberty,* (albeit most often against Law and Reason) *to trench upon and invade the Rights and Prerogatives of their Soveraignes, for private interest of their owne advantages*; in the execution whereof, *it is their property always to make ease with will, and hope, that which in justice they cannot expect, and in reason they know to be hard to obtaine.*

What advantage did the inconstant and giddy *Athenians* procure to their state by the expulsion of their hereditary Kings, and setting up, of first their Decennall Governours, and after them their Annuall Magistrates, and after them their Anarchy, or Democraticall forme, and after that their Oligarchy of foure hundred Commoners, and last of all their thirty Tirants? but a continuall succession of warre, and finall destruction of their State and Countrey; as witnesse *Herodotus, Dionysius, Halicarnassæus, Pausanias, Thucidides, Justinus, Polibius*, and others? what priviledge did the people of *Rome* enjoy more from the Lords and Senate of *Rome*, after the banishment of the race of the *Tarquins* (though tyrannous, cruell, and usurpers) then formerly they had done under their hereditary Kings, or fewer under *Julius Cæsar*, and his successors, when it was againe reduced to a Monarchy, then they had formerly done when *Rome* enjoy'd the appellation of a State or Common-wealth? Surely not at all, if *Livy* and *Varro* may be Judges, the *Gabell* of *France* was raised upon this occasion: The Duke of *Orleans* rose up in Armes against the King of *France*, drawing much people after him, upon pretence to reforme the Government, and to ease the people from oppression; to maintaine his Rebellion, hee raised an impostion upon the people, which hee called the *Gabell*; the King overcame him, and after the war ended, the Tax continuing, and the King passing through those parts where it was leavied; the people petitioned the King to take off the Tax, much complaining of it, the K. asked them who put it upon them? they answered, the Duke of *Orleans*; the K. replyed, let the Duke of *Orleans* then take it off; but the Duke being

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vanquiſhed had no power to do it, but it lies ſtill upon the Subjects of *France* as a reward of their foule Rebellion: What advantages the *Liegois* and *Gantois* obtained, by riſing up in Armes againſt *John* and *Charles*, Dukes of *Burgundy*, their Supreame Lords, *Comines* will tell you, nay, *I challenge any man to ſhew any particular City or Countrey that ever thrived by Rebellion, all circumſtances being duly conſidered*; and to inſtance in our owne Kingdome what benefit accrued to the people of *England* by the Barons wars againſt King *Iohn*, and his Son King *Henry* the Third? for ſixty yeares together, with ſome ſmall intermiſſions of peace, or rather feigned Truce then only an effuſion of bloud, and redemption of their eſtates by Fines, and of their perſons by Ranſome, who raiſed warre againſt them, as appeares by that Statute called *Dictum de Kenilworth* made 51. *Hen.* 3. what great matter of profit, but a bloudy, civill, and inteſtine warre (for the right of the Crowne) for well nigh 40. years ſuceeded upon the depoſition of King *Richard* the Second and promoting K. *Henry* the Fourth to the Crown againſt right?

To conclude this poſition, *Tanta eſt enim vis voluptatum ut & ignorantiam prohiberit in occaſione, & conſcientiam corrumpet in diſſimulationem. Tertull lib. de ſpectac. It is hard for men to diſcerne, and withſtand the flatteries of their owne appetites; but it is leſſe difficult and more ſafe to keepe the way of Iuſtice, and honeſty, then to turne aſide from it*; Reaſon allowes every one to deſire to aſpire to a greater fortune by lawfull meanes; But withall it is an office juſt in all inferiour degrees, to beare without grudging the ordinance and ſentence of their lot, otherwiſe there will be confuſion in all Empires and Governments, if it were permitted to every one that is ſubject to aſpire to liberty. *Comines* a great Stateſman obſerves, *that he never knew man in all his life, that either ſought an unlawfull liberty, or that ſought to put in feare, or hold in ſubjection his Prince, that ever came to good end.* And *Machiavell* gives it for a rule, that thoſe that by unſound advice, evill choice, or naturall inclination, diſagree with their Soveraignes, commonly live unhappily, and their actions have but ill ſucceſſes; therefore as the Baron of *Pontremy* a *Florentine* notes, *that in ſuch kind of engagements it is one of the*

principallest parts of a wiseman to consider before he begins the end and issue of the enterprise, aswell for his owne sake as for those that enter with him into the action. That State that is changed, either begins first by violence, or wrong, or without it when it begins with violence it must needs begin with doing wrong to many, and it is likely to fall out in its destruction, that they who have been wronged, revenge themselves, and so from their desire of revenge, proceeds the effusion of blood, and death of many, who will then be the loser it is easie to judge?

4. I come now to paraphrase upon the fourth position, or head, which is, *that those that make innovation in Government, commonly use the Subjects worse than the Prince that is dispossest of his power.* In things obtained after they have been long desired, men find neither that contentment, nor that pleasure which they imagined before, especially in cases of innovation in Government; for when those usurpers are *mounted* upon the Throne, by suppression of their Prince, whose duty it had been to preserve him, they commonly forget not to practice those vices they accused their Prince of, and disdaine to remember his vertues: *For there is no greater enemy to a man then his owne ill gotten, to great prosperity, for that it makes him impatient of himselfe, full of liberty, bold to do evill, and desirous not only to disturbe himselfe, but the good of others by Innovations, and new things; such is the accursed nature of ambitious Rebellion, that it knoweth neither Father, Mother, Brother, Sister, Wife, Kindred or Friends, nor sometimes not her owne children;* hence it comes to passe, that natures impatient of subjection, when once they have broken loose from the rigour of Authority, and are advanced to supreame Command, love nothing more then the execution of cruelty, and not only run into greater exorbitances, but ordinarily act those crimes they did accuse their Prince of, with greater greedinesse and cumulation of offences, then they objected he did; wherein they ever proceed from ill to worse; *regarding the common good no otherwise then as it is accessary to their owne wicked purposes;* There are too many evidents to be found in History of this truth, for brevity sake I will instance only in two (not only proving the former positions, but also the truth of that which we now have in hand.)

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The City of *Syracuſe* had been long governed by hereditary Kings, vertuous and juſt, ſave only *Thraſibulus*, the laſt of the race of *Gelon* was *ſuſpected to be a Tyrant*, him the *Syracuſians* depoſed after ten months Government, after they had depoſed him, to prevent the greatneſſe of any one among them, for the future, they deviſed a kind of baniſhment of ſuch among them as were ſuſpected; taking paterne from the *Athenian* Oſtraciſme, they called this their new deviſed judgement of *Exile*. *Petaliſmus*, (wherein every one wrote upon an Olive leafe, as at *Athens*, they wrote upon Shels) the name of him whom they would have expelled the City, *he that had moſt ſuffrages againſt him, was baniſhed the City for five years*, hereby in a ſhort time it came to paſſe, *that thoſe of Judgement and beſt able to governe the Common-weale, were by the worſt able, either ſuppreſt or thruſt out of the City*. By this Law the Nobility having practiſed to baniſh one another, the State became altogether popular, *which was a curſe ſufficient to their City, ſeeing that there is nothing ſo terrible in any State as a powerfull and authorized ignorance*. This *Democracy* carried it ſelfe ſo wickedly, that as our Authour obſerves, God raiſed up *Dioniſius* to take vengeance as well of their cruelty towards ſtrangers, as of their ingratitude towards their owne beſt Citizens; for before the time of *Dioniſius*, they had made it their paſtime to reward the vertue of their worthieſt Citizens with death or diſgrace: his firſt favour among the *Syracuſians* grew from his accuſation of the principall men; *It is the delight of baſe people to rule over their betters*: Wherefore gladly did he help them to break down, as fetters impriſoning their liberty, the bars that held it under ſafe cuſtody; he ſpared none of his known, no nor his ſuſpected enemies, he was the greateſt robber that ever lived in any State, & the moſt unreſpectively cruell, *A fit ſcourge for ſuch foule miſdemeanors, and Cruelties committed by the people during their popular Government*. The City of *Athens*, and Territory of *Attica* had been originally governed, and very proſperouſly by hereditary Kings: And becauſe that *Codrus* the 30. King of the Race, willingly dyed for the ſafety of his People, he was therefore ſo hono-

noured by them, as (thinking none worthy to succeed him) they changed their former Government from Monarchicall, to Princes, for terme of life, of which *Medon* the Sonne of *Codrus* was the first, of whom his Successors by election, which were twelve in number, were called *Medontidæ*; but after sufficient experience that those elective Princes, (who had no hereditary right to the Crowne, but only a limitation of Government to their lives,) and for that only reason made a prey of the people, and studied more to rob them for their particular advantages, then to mannage the Government for the publique good: they laid aside that forme of Government, and appointed *Archons*, or *Decennall* Governors, or one Prince for ten yeares; but finding the like inconvenience in that, with something a more swift rapine, because the time of the expectation of their gaine was something shorter, they after the tryall of seven *Archons* or ten years Governours buried that forme, and set up annuall Magistrates; but their oppression was so great, that that forme continued but for seven successions, of whom *Solon* that most excellent Law-giver was the last: this State finding no better rest then in Monarchy, submitted againe to it, under *Pisistratus*, who left the Crowne to his Sonne *Hippias*, whom the inconstant *Athenians* drove out of his Country, (and enforced him to flie unto *Darius* King of *Persia*, to crave aid for restitution to his Crowne,) the only cause of all the wars, commotions, and troubles that followed in *Greece* for 300. yeares after, to the utter ruine, destruction, and enslaving of the Nation. After *Hippias* was thus driven out, the *Athenians* would admit of no other forme of Government then only *Democraticall*; herein they were so insolent (saith our Author) that no integrity, nor good desert was able to preserve the estate of any such as had borne any great office, longer then by flattering the rascall multitude, he was contented to forme all his words and actions to their good likeing; nay they banished their famous Generall *Themistocles*, who had been their only deliverer from the fury of the *Persian* invasion, only for endeavouring to restraine by wise Counsels, the riotous

riotous excesse of their extreame folly and madnesse; The confusion of this popular Government, brought so many, and such great troubles upon their Countrey, that by reason thereof the Subjects of the *Athenian* estate began to rebell, of whom some they reduced under their obedience, others held out, some for feare of greater inconvenience were set at liberty, promising only to be their good friends, as formerly they had been their Subjects; Others having a kind of libertie offered by the Athenians were not therewith contented, but obtained a true and perfect libertie by force. Among these troubles it fell out very unseasonably, that the principall men of *Athens*, being wearied with the peoples Insolency took upon them to change the form of that estate, and to bring the government into the hands of a few; To which purpose conspiring with the Captains which were abroad, they caused them to set up the form of an Aristocracy, in the Towns of their confederates; and in the meane time, some that were most likely to withstand this innovation, being slain at *Athens*, the Commonalty were so dismaid, that none durst speake against the Conspirators, whose number they knew not, but every man was afraid of his Neighbour, lest he should be a member of the league. *In this generall feare, the Majestie of* Athens *was usurped by foure hundred men, who observed in shew the ancient forme of proceeding, did cause all matters to be propounded unto the people, and concluded upon by the greater part of voices: but the things propounded were onely such as were first allowed in private among themselves: neither had the Commonalty any other libertie, then onely to approve and give consent: for whosoever presumed any further was quickly dispatched out of the way, and no inquirie made of the Murther.* By these meanes were many decrees made, all tending to the establishment of this new Authority, which nevertheless endured not long: But this Government having imbroyled the State of *Athens* in a bloudy and furious Warre, with the *Peloponesians*, which was the ruine of their City, and subversion of their walls, they in hope to better their distracted Condition, *choose thirtie Governours, commonly called the thirtie Tyrants of* Athens, *who were chosen at the first by the people, to compile a body of their Lawes, and make a collection of such ancient Statutes, as were meet to be put in practise;*

The condition of the Citie standing as it did in that so suddain alteration. To this Charge was annexed the supreme authority, either as a recompence of their labours, or because the necessitie of the times did so require it, wherein the Law being uncertaine, it was fit that such men should give judgement in particular causes, to whose judgement the Lawes themselves by which the City was to be ordered, were become subject: But these thirty, having so great power in their hands, were more carefull to hold it then to deserve it, by faithfull execution of that which was committed to them in trust.

Therefore apprehending such troublesome fellowes, as were odious to the City, though not punishable, therefore by Law, they condemned them to death; which proceeding was by all men highly approved, who considered their lewd Conditions, but did not withall bethinke themselves, how easie a thing it would bee unto these thirtie men, to take away the lives of Innocents, by calling them perturbers of the Peace, or what else they listed, when condemnation without true triall, and proofe had beene once well allowed. Having thus plausibly entred into a wicked course of Government, they thought it best to fortifie themselves with a sure guard, ere they brake out into those disorders, which they must needs commit for the establishing of their authority; wherefore dispatching two of their owne company to *Sparta*, they informed the *Lacedæmonians*, that it was the full intent of the thirty, to keep the City free from all rebellious motions: to which purpose it behoved them to cut off such as were seditious, and therefore desired the *Lacedæmonians*, to send them a Garrison, which they promised at their owne cost to maintaine: This motion was well approved, and a guard sent, the Capraine of which was so well entertained by the thirty, that none of their misdeeds could want his high Commendations at *Sparta*: Hereupon the Tyrants began to take heart, and looking no more after base and detested persons, invaded the principall men of the City, sending armed men from house to house, who drew out such as were of great reputation, and likely, or able to make any head against this wicked forme of Government, whereby there was such effusion of bloud, as to *Theramenes* (one of the thirty) seemed very horrible, and unable to escape vengeance; his dislike of

their proceedings being onely discovered, causes his fellowes to bethinke themselves, and provide for their owne security, and his destruction, lest he should make himselfe a Captain of the discontented; (which were almost the whole City) and redeem his owne Peace with their ruine; wherefore they selected three thousand of the Citizens whom they thought meetest, and gave unto them, some part of publique Authority, the rest they disarmed: & having thus increased their own strength, and weakned their opposites, they began a fresh to shed the bloud, not onely of their private Enemies, but of such whose monie or goods might inrich them, and inable them for the payment of their guard; And to this purpose they concluded, that every one of them should name one man, upon whose goods he should seize, putting the owner to death; But when *Theramenes* uttered his detestation of so wicked intent, then did *Critias* (who of all the thirty was most Tyrannical) accuse him to the Councell, as a trecherous man and (whereas one maine Priviledge of the three thousand was, that none of them should suffer death, at the appointment of the thirty, but have the accustomed triall,) hee tooke upon him to strike out of that number, the name of *Theramenes*, and so reduced him under the triall and sentence of that order. It was well alledged by *Theramenes*, that his name was not more easie to be blotted out of the Catologue, then any other mans; upon which consideration, he devised them all, to conceive no otherwise of his case then as of their owne, who were liable to the same forme of proceeding: but every man choosing rather to preserve his owne life by silence, then presently to draw upon himself the danger, which as yet concerned him little, and perhaps would never come neer him, The Tyrants Interpreting silence as consent, condemned him forthwith, & compelled him to drink poison. After the death of *Theramenes*, the 30 Tyrants began to use such Outrages as excelled their former Villanies; for having three thousand as they thought firme unto them, they robbed all others without feare or shame; dispoyling them of Lands and Goods, and caused them to flye into banishment for safegurd of

their lives. In conclusion, the whole Citie rise against them, tooke them and slew them, which done, to avoyd further inconvenience, *A Law was made, that all injuries past should be forgotten, and no man called into question for wrongs committed: By which order wisely made, and carefully observed, the Citie returned to her former quietnesse.* Many instances more might be given; but (because in this lazie age, wherein no man will take paines to read a Pamphlet that containes above a Sheet, though it comprehend never so much seasonable truth,) I will leave this particular to the judicious Readers, to make the parallell betweene the latter Government of the State of *Athens*, after she had put off the Kingly Regiment, to the present times wherein we live; and to improve the History to the best use and service of their Native Countrey, and to this distressed and almost destroyed Kingdome, as God shall direct them, with this note of Remembrance, * *That in the dayes when there was no King in Israel, every man did that which was right in his owne eyes, even the making of gods, or destroying of men.*

* Judg. 17. 6.

5. The fifth Position is, that the Kingdome of *England* by a continuance of this Warre, will runne the hazard to be devoured by a Forreigne Prince or Nation.

In all humane actions, and specially in Warres men ought to accommodate their counsells to the preservation of their Countries, and not for the desire to obtaine their owne particular ends, which for the most part are hard and impossible, to put the whole in manifest perill; It is the common nature of all men to feare most the dangers that be neerest at hand, to esteeme more then is necessary, things present, and to make lesse reckoning then they ought, of such as are far off and to come, seeing that to the same are referred many hopes of Remedies, as well by the favour of time as benefit of accidents: But wise men, who have alwayes their eyes in their fore-heads, diligently consider the ends of things, and the probabilitie of all events, as well as the beginnings, and to provide against all accidents of fortune, so farre as they may be discerned by the wit of man; whosoever duely considers the nature of this Warre, the long continued Plot to bring

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it on, the slender occasions moving to it, the implacable violence of the severall Factions in the Kingdome each against other, the fomenting of these differences by the *French* and *Scottish* Nations, their readinesse to assist all sides, to keepe up the War by an even ballance, till the Kingdome be so wasted and weakned, that it cannot either through want of power (or will not through dis-affection of each partie to other) defend it selfe against their victorious invasions. Whosoever shall take due consideration of the Aspiring desires of the *French*, to the universall Monarchy of Christendome, their antient League and Amitie with the *Scots*, the great advancement that the Conquest of *England* would give to that high designe of an universall Monarchy, by the helpe of Shipping, Navigation, and Treasure, with continuall Recruits of men to carry on their desires withall; not omitting to call to mind the unprofitable barrennesse and unpleasing coldnesse of the *Scottish* soyle and climate, the inviting fertilitie, moderate temperature, and more pleasing wealth of the Kingdome of *England*, (considerations which at this day have brought the *Swedes* out of their cold and barren Kingdom to invade *Germany*) and before these times, have in all ages of the world invited the Nations of the barren, comfortlesse, cold and frozen Regions of the North, to invade the more Southern, Easterne, and Westerne parts of the world, either to get wealth, to obtaine more pleasing, warmer, richer, or more comfortable habitations, wherein they have setled themselves; (as witnes the often invasions of the Tartars into *China* & *India*, the incursions of the Sarmations or Russians into the lesser *Asia* and *Palestine*, the Turkes from beyond the cold mountaines of *Caucasus*, into the rich Kingdomes of *Media*, *Persia*, *Mesopotamia*, *Babylon*, *Asia* the lesse, *Arabia*, *Syria*, *Palestina*, and a great part of *Greece*, the Hunnes and Longobards upon *Italy*, *Lombardy* and part of *France*, the Gothes and Vandalls likewise upon the *Roman* Empire, *France*, *Holland*, and *Flanders*.) I say, that whosoever shall duely consider these fore-going particulars, cannot otherwise then in reason conclude, that this Kingdome runnes it selfe by these Civill Warres into a condition to be over-runne by some

Forreine Prince or Nation, and not onely this, but *Ireland* alſo is in danger to be loſt; what other can be expected but a Forreigne invaſion? if this Warre ſhould continue any longer, (which God forbid) & I am extremely wel aſſured His Gracious Majeſtie (who deſires a juſt and honourable Peace for the good of his people) deſires not, what other can be expected? *Then that nature which teacheth every man under heaven to provide for his owne, and the neceſſary preſervation of his poſteritie, ſhould direct His Majeſtie (who if he might avoid it otherwiſe, I thinke he would not,) to joyne with one of the two parties, either Presbyterian, or Independent, for the preſervation of His Royall Eſtate and Kingdomes*; which if he ſhall doe, who doubts, but that that party which joynes with His Majeſtie, & the Royall party, which will always adhere unto him & the ſide he takes, will give way to the other; and what the iſſue of that will be cannot be doubted; *the laſt refuge of the weaker ſide will be to bring in forraigne Forces, and no doubt may be procured for their owne advantages, and to compaſſe their owne deſignes*; as we ſee the Rebellious Barons of *England* did againſt King *Henry* the third, bringing in *Lewis* the Prince, after King of *France*, with an Army of *French*, offering him the Crowne of *England* for his aſſiſtance; this was all the care they had of their native Country. *It happeneth alwayes in States falne into diviſion, that no man makes conſcience to hinder the publike benefit, to imbaſe the reputation of his Adverſaries. In Civill warres commonly vaine ambition, and ſelfe-preſervation, are more regarded then the common profit*: for it is a thing naturall, that hatred followeth upon conceived injury, and offences and vexations come after hatred; and after offences, men draw to alliance and amity, with the enemies of him whom they have offended, labouring to raiſe practiſes againſt him, not onely for their owne proper ſurety, but alſo to make their profit of him whom they have firſt injured. *It is the cuſtome of all vanquiſhed parties, in hatred of their preſent Lords, to throw themſelves indiſcreetly into the protection of others, that prove worſe then the former, changing by this meanes the wealth and quiet they ſhould en-*

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joy under the protection of their naturall Kings, to the hard ſervitude they muſt expect from forraigne and called in aydes: for no Prince or State will aſſiſt any other, but to make their owne profit of their troubles: It being proper to all Princes, not to enter into the travells and expences of Warre for others, but to Reigne over thoſe for whom they fight. Thus the people, (who by nature are alwayes deſirous of Innovation, and eaſily filled with vaine errours, and falſe perſwaſions, who are moved at the appetite of any that will provoke them, as the waves of the Sea are carried with the blaſts of the winde) being many times deceived by an imaginary good, doe for the moſt part covet their owne ruine, which of neceſſity muſt be the caſe of this Kingdome, if theſe wars continue; for *it is a manifeſt token of immixent deſtruction, when they that ought to continue together in amity, ſever themſelves and forſake each other*; and it is impoſſible to guarde a Fort or Kingdome that hath enemies both without and within; the conſideration whereof ought to be a ſtrong perſwaſion to men of all ſorts and conditions, to ſeeke a juſt and honourable peace with their King, and not thinke to put ſuch conditions of peace upon him, *as neither Juſtice will warrant, dutie promote, nor time make good*, which is the next head to be handled.

6. He who ſhall look backe upon the unnaturall, civill Commotions of this Kingdome of *England*, for theſe five yeares laſt paſt, the great effuſion of bloud, the horrible rapine, and Plunder, the exceſſive cruelty, extortion, and oppreſſion practiſed upon the people, the vaſt expence of Treaſure, amounting to no leſſe then 40 Millions of money upon a favourable computation (a ſum almoſt not to be named with any hope of beliefe, either at home or in forreigne Countries, though I am confident it will eaſily appeare to be much more) the ſmall effect of a pretended Reformation, the laying waſte of the Church as a wilderneſſe, the overthrow and impoveriſhing of ſo many honourable Familes of the Nobility and Gentry of this Land, who for their naturall, and indiſpenſable duty of Allegeance to their

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King, have been destroyed in this late war, and shall observe a new war breaking out in the bowels of the Kingdome, to the utter destruction, and desolation of it if it be not by Gods mercy prevented, will if he have any feare of God, or love to his native Countrey, *thinke it high time to thinke of, talke of, write of, nay to treat of peace*, not an unjust or temporall peace, which only will skinne over the festered wounds of the Kingdome, for a time, but an honourable, a just, a firme, and a lasting peace, which may cure and search the wounds to the Core, and restore the Kingdome to her former lustre, plenty, and tranquility, and such a peace, can never be obtained in *England*, unlesse the King be freely and absolutely restored to his just and legall Rights, and Prerogatives, without diminution or restriction: *For if any of the Kings Rights, be either forced from him by restraint of his Person, or by violence of Armes*, It can in no reason be expected, that he should be bound by the Conditions, since that all pactions and contracts of Subjects, and common persons wrested out of them by force or Imprisonment, are made void by the Law, much lesse will the Articles and Covenants of Kings, (who are under no Co-active power of Lawes) wrested from them either by the terror of the Sword, or the restraint of libertie, be of any binding validitie whatsoever, but are avoydable both by the Law of nature and Nations; the Consideration whereof caused that famous Emperor *Charles* the fifth, to set at libertie *Francis* of *Angolesme* the first King of *France* of that name, who was taken in warre at the Battell of *Pavia*, to Treat with him for the Conclusion of a Peace to be had betweene them; the like did *Charles* Duke of *Burgundy*, to *Lewis* the 11. King of *France*, who unwisely put himselfe into his hands at *Novare*, as *Guiciardine* and *Comines* respectively informe us, and this they did by the advice of all the Kings, Princes, States-men, and Learned Doctors of the Lawes, of the greatest part of Christendome, (who were all of opinion, that it was the best and most sure way to make a firme agreement, to set those KINGS at libertie before their Treaties of Peace; for a Ma-

Machiavel ſaith, *It is no diſhonour to a Prince, to violate thoſe promiſes which by force he was conſtrained to make, and that alwayes promiſes extorted, (regarding the publique) when there is want of ſtrength, ſhall be broken, and that without the diſgrace of him that breaks them.* It is impoſſible that where much blood hath been ſhed, and other like outrages committed, that a peace made by force, ſhould continue, the parties looking one another in the face every day. Therefore Maſter *Clement Edmonds*, in his Obſervations upon *Ceſars* Commentaries, deſcanting upon a peace, concluded between *Ceſar* and the Gaules, by force of *Ceſars* ſword, and afterwards broken by the Gaules, gives it for a rule, *That Accords made by force, will never be truly kept, neither by King nor Common-wealth.* It is a leſſon taught by Nature, *That no man is bound to performe that, whereunto his will is conſtrained to give conſent by force.* If the peace be good and faithfull, it will be perpetuall, but if it be ill or unjuſt, then of little continuance, *for none will continue longer in an over-burthened eſtate, then meere neceſſity doth enforce*: Let every man that hath an intereſt in the Kingdome and peace of it, therefore conſider, that the nineteen Propoſitions made to the King, will never procure the peace of this Kingdome; or if they doe, *that peace will never hold.* The King muſt freely be ſet at liberty before he treat, and be reſtored to all his rights, and juſt prerogatives, (which the Law gives him) or there can be no firme peace in this Kingdom, notwithſtanding any imaginations to the contrary. *As reſt is the end of all motion, and the laſt perfection of things that labour, ſo is peace the end of all warre, ſo it be laſting, and made by free accord: but if it be enforced, it alwayes containes the ſeeds of new commotions, which never end without the deſtruction of the promoters of them.* God ſend us an happy and firme peace in this poore and miſerably waſted Kingdome, and bleſſe them that ſeeke and enſue it; *for nothing can redeeme this almoſt ruined and diſtracted Kingdome from an inevitable and finall deſtruction, but a firme and laſting peace betweene the King and his people, concluded with full and free conſent of both ſides in a free and well choſen Parliament, not guided by faction, nor governed by tumults, upon the tearmes before rehearſed.*

7. The ſeventh and laſt Poſition is, That the City of London

can never be ſo happy, or flouriſhing under the ſtrained government of the Two Houſes of Parliament, as under the protection of their naturall King; whoſoever ſhall duly premeditate that the ancient originall, and long continued government of this Kingdome of England, was and is Monarchical, that it is founded in divine right, and the Law of Nature, (which the two Houſes ſhall never be able juſtly to affirme of theirs, or if they affirme it, ſure I am they are not able to prove it, with the help of their whole Synod) that our moſt gracious King CHARLES is lawfully ſetled and veſted in this government, as true and lawfull Soveraigne Lord and King by hereditary right, and by true and lawfull deſcent and ſucceſſion, derived unto him by the royal race of his Kingly progenitors, of ancient time, (even long before the incarnation of our moſt bleſſed Saviour Jeſus Chriſt) and that before that time this famous City of London was built by a King of this Realme, as appeares both by *Ceſars* Commentaries, *Cornelius Tacitus*, and other ancient and authentique Hiſtories, written before the Nativity of Chriſt, *that this City hath obtained many and great priviledges* by the gracious conceſſions, and grants of His Majeſty and his Royall Progenitors, Kings of this Realme, under whom they have lived as free-men, and not vaſſals, in flouriſhing and happy eſtate, and have contracted much wealth, inlarged their buildings, and increaſed their commerce with forreigne Nations abroad over all the world, and obtained many priviledges and immunities from many mighty Emperours and forreigne Princes by the interceſſion, mediation, and recommendations of His Majeſty and his Royall Predeceſſors, Kings and Queenes of this Realme: nay, who ſhould ſeriouſly conſider, that there are very many religious, wiſe, and wealthy men of this City, cannot but ſtand amazed, when he ſhall call to mind, that this City hath aſſiſted the two Houſes in this late War againſt the King, with ſo many Armies of men, that they have lent ſuch immenſe ſummes of money, upon ſo weak and deceivable a ſurety, as Publique faith, (who can never be made ſolvant, but by a good and juſt peace, with the Kings conſent) that with all their induſtry and power they have indeavoured to ſet up the two Houſes above the King, & to ſettle the Soveraignty of the Kingdom in them *by ſubmitting*

to their illegall ordinances, (which bind not at all in Law without the Kings consent) and by acknowledging of them, and calling of them a State, (for reward whereof, the two Houſes of Parliament have deveſted them of their Militia, made them their burthen-bearing Mule, to carry all their unlawfull Taxes, Impoſitions, Loanes and Benevolences, Exciſe, and other new and unheard-of Taxations, *(a thouſand fold exceeding thoſe that were laid upon them by the King)* and now when they will beare their burthens no longer, they threaten to beat them back and ſide, with ruine and deſtruction; a thing wonderfully to be admired, that ſo many wiſe men and valiant, as are in the City, ſhould indure this; and truly I muſt needs ſay, that I ſhould extreamly wonder at it, were it not ſo, that I know *that wiſe men have not at all times a diſcretion or judgement perfect, ſeeing it is neceſſary that the ſigns of the weakneſſe and frailty of mans underſtanding, ſhould many times be diſcovered*; but I confeſſe I ſhall wonder much more, if they continue in ſo faire an obſequencie of bearing the two Houſes burdens any longer; for truly I take it to be much againſt the proper and true intereſt of the City, (being of it ſelfe ſo rich and powerfull) that it ſhould ſubmit it ſelfe to the juriſdiction of any free State whatſoever, eſpecially of this pretended one of the two Houſes: *If they doe*, they can expect no leſſe, then to be ridden with a rough Bit. What made *Troy* hold out a ſiege of ten yeeres, but that it feared to ſubmit it ſelfe under the juriſdiction of the Free States of Greece? What made Piſa hold out ſeven yeeres wars againſt the State of Florencia, but that it feared and hated a ſubjection to the tyrannie of State-government? What cauſed the City of Carthage to make ſuch powerfull impreſſions and diverſions by *Hannibal* their Generall, and others, into Spain and Italy, but onely to defend themſelves from the ſubjection of the State of Rome? And have not Geneva, Vincenſa, Padua, and Cremonia, made many notable defences againſt the aſſaults of the State of Venice? (becauſe they wel knew the ſlavery of a people that live under a free State, and to put themſelves under the protection of the Pope, the Emperour, and the King of France, not their naturall Princes.)

For refuge againſt ſuch ſubjection, inſtances many more might be

given, but a word to the wise is enough. But this take for an assured maxime of truth, that the *subiects of free states endure much more slavery and hard usage, at the hands of their Lords, then those that are under a free Prince*; there can bee no perfect love betweene a free state, and a rich and populous City that is able to awe it; and therefore in their most peaceable Condition, there wil be alwayes an unproclaimed warre from the state to the Citty; occasioned by feares and Iealousies; Through feare, that the City wilbe too opulent and mighty for the state, *therefore the state ought to keepe the City poore or too mighty for them, therefore they ought alwaies to keepe a Guard over the City, to keep it in the greater subjection*, and this they will surely do, for Nature instructs every man, to keep a strict watch over those they stand in fear of, and to use all manner of prevention against threatning dangers; But on the contrary side, the City being the Royall Chamber of the King, *The King will cherish it, Endow it with Priviledges, Adorne it with titles, enrich it with munificences, & With a bountiful, & kingly clemency, pardon al their offences, It is for the honour & Glory of the King, that the City should be rich, Powerfull and Mighty,* (as long as they are dutifull) *beeause it is his Royall Chamber*: The riches & power of the people, are the strength of the King, *because he is just & merciful*, but they are a terror to States, becaus they are alwaies tyrannous, the King granted the Millit: to the City, to use at their discretion, (so they use it not against him, contrary to Law) & never recalled this grant, the two Houses you see vote it from hand to hand, as a shuttlecock into any hands they are commanded by the multitude, driving one Ordinance out by another, as children do paper pellets out of a Pot-gunne, the Kings grant argues a trust, and confidence he hath in the City, and an affection to the City, with a desire of preservation to them, by their own Armes, The Houses votes argue a distrust they have in the City, and therfore they would have the militia in such hands as they confide in & not the City, that they may Chastise them with their own Armes. The difference is plain, by and under the King your natural Leige Lord, you may enjoy Wealth, Peace, Honour, and protection, *By and from the strained Government of the two Houses, you can expect nothing but plunder, poverty, perpetuall unproclaimed war, and slavish subjection.*

Be

Be wiſe therefore, O thou City of *London*; and take it not ill, that I adviſe thee to it, for I hope thou ſhalt find profit by it, *no man can poſſibly come ſo well furniſhed to any courſe of life, but that time and experience, and good adviſe do teach him that he knew not before.* Return to thy duty, thy natural duty of Alleigance, to thy natural and Sovereign King, with a willing obedience, not tyed to any ſelf-ſeeking conditions: *Obedience upon condition or with profeſt unwillingneſſe to obey, is no better then manifeſt diſobedience,* Be faithful to your King; * an honeſt & learned Officer of thine own hath taught thee, that, *there is not any vertue that can challenge a greater meaſure of honour, or hath more prerogative either among friends or enemies, then fidelity*: know, *that infidelity can finde no ſafe harbour*: Petition His Majeſtie to come to ſit in Parliament, and the two Houſes to admit *him, but leave out thoſe reſtrictive Limitations of confirming his offer made at* Holmby, *the Covenant or a Treaty with the Scots, theſe are but miſts caſt before thine eyes to ingage thee in a new Warre,* they are but the ſubtilties of ſuch as have offended his Royall Majeſty beyond hope of pardon, or of ambitious men, who will not willingly part with the reines of incroched power out of their hands, or of beggerly ſouldiers of fortune that will make profit of thy troubles, becauſe they know thou art rich, and they know not how otherwiſe to live: *It is a Counſell ill digeſted to ſtir at the perſwaſions of unpardonable, ambitious, or beggerly perſons.* Make thy peace in good earneſt with the King, and engage thy ſelfe to none other, for it is thy ſafeſt way: For *it is beſt policy alwayes in contracting of leagues, rather to follow thy duty, and the ancient amity thou hadſt with the King, then to embrace new friendſhips with others, which will ever be unfaithfull and ſuſpitious.* Feare not to doe thy duty to thy King, in declaring for the King, more then thou didſt to fight againſt him: for *Feare which is the betrayer of thoſe ſuccours which reaſon affordeth, when it hath once poſſeſt the heart of man, it caſteth thence both courage and underſtanding; ſo deviliſh is the nature of man, when Reaſon, which ſhould be his guide, is become a ſlave to his brutiſh affections.* Be not over-cunning in thy wayes, for that is but a crooked and ſiniſter kind of wiſdome, but declare for him in plaine and good meaning, and think not that the King is too low, but looke upon the juſtice of

* *Clem. Edmunds Obſervations upon Ceſars Commentaries.*

his cauſe, and aſſure thy ſelfe, that though *Innocency may be ſuppreſt by Envy and Malice, yet the truth can never be overcome by force, fraud, or injuring.* Uuwarrantable pollicies, or unjuſt gaines, yeild in the end to the worldly man, neither comfort or reliefe: Take heed how thou doſt enter into any new actions, or engagements againſt the King, and be well adviſed what thou doeſt, for, *there is nothing more hard to avoid then juſtice, neither can any remedy availe againſt thoſe evills, thy diſobedience will draw from heaven upon thee.* Be not ambitious to become a free ſtate, but remember I tell thee, that, *the State that becomes free, finds alwayes enemies to ſide againſt it, but no friends to ſide with it.* I know thou canſt not well avoid thy declaring for the King, doe it therefore, and thou wilt receive honour. *Wiſe men gain themſelves the thanks of every thing in their actions, although in truth, meere neceſſity in any caſe conſtrains them to doe them.* If thou ſhalt declare thy ſelf freely for the King, thou canſt not faile to triumph with victory, and to be glorious, for *whatſoever undertaking hath juſt grounds for a foundation, (as thoſe of thy duty to the King are, and good, deliberate & ſound counſell for Conductor) which I doubt not but thou wilt take, though the ſucceſſe doth not alwayes anſwer the probability, yet hath Fortune nothing elſe thereof to vaunt, then the variableneſſe of her owne nature, which onely the Divine Providence, and not any humane power can conſtraine.* And whatſoever thou ſhalt doe, in this particular of ſubmitting thy ſelfe to thy King, doe it inſtantly, and delay not, *for ſlow remedies doe little help preſent dangers.* But if thou ſhalt perſiſt in thy former obſtinacie, when thou art preſt with extremities, remember this counſel I have given thee, & withall that I told thee, that *Fortune is conſtant in nothing more then in miſchiefe, nor juſtice in revenge.* And if all this move thee not, but thou continue ſtil in thy diſobedience, expect from me ere long, a Catalogue of a hundred of the greateſt Cities that have been in the world laid waſt, and brought to Ruine, by Pride and Rebellion: And I deſire thee to conſult the Prophets, and apply their predictions of the down-fall of Rebellious Cities, to thy ſelf; eſpecially *Jeremiah* 19. 6. 7. 8.

6. Behold ſaith the *Lord*, that this place ſhall no more be called *Tophet*, nor the valley of the ſon of *Hinnon*, but the valley of ſlaughter.

7. And

7. And I will make void the councell of *Iudah* and *Ierusalem*, in this place, and I will cause them to fall by the sword before their enemies, and by the hands of them that seek their lives, and their carkasses will I give to be meat for the fowls of the Heaven, and for the beasts of the earth.

8. And I will make this City desolate, and an hissing, every one that passeth thereby, shall be astonished, and hisse because of all the plagues thereof.

Which Judgements, I pray God of his infinite mercy to remove from thee; and to make thee obedient to him thy Maker and Re deemer, and unto thy King under him, thy Supream Governour, *Amen.*

POST-SCRIPT.

IT is like enough thou wilt take this my pains in ill part, for good counsell and worthy acts are more often requited with ingratitude and reproach, then with reward and commendation: But it is all one to me if thou dost, for I am resolved to serve my Country without regret.

FINIS.